Mexican Drug Cartel Use of UAV-delivered Munitions

Trevor Ball

For more than a decade, Mexican drug cartels have used commercially available (COTS; commercial off-the-shelf), small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs; also called ‘drones’) to smuggle drugs across the U.S.–Mexico border and to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) tasks. Increasingly, cartels are also using small UAVs to employ lethal munitions, mirroring tactics adopted in recent years by state and non-state actors across the globe. A variety of non-state armed groups—including the so-called Islamic State, Hezbollah, and Hamas—have experimented with UAV-delivered munitions since as early as 2012. This trend has continued apace:

Increasingly, both state and non-state actors have used COTS small UAVs to execute direct strike missions using improvised air-delivered munitions (IADMs) and modified conventional munitions. Analysis of the use of these improvised and craft-produced aerial munitions in recent years has shown that, in conjunction with COTS or ‘hobbyist grade’ UAVs, they can provide a modest precision strike capability to belligerents.” — Friese, Jenzen-Jones & Smallwood, 2017.

Mexican drug cartels have used UAVs to deliver explosive munitions since at least 2017. In 2023, there were 260 documented attacks in which UAVs were used in this way. UAV-delivered munitions have been used by cartels to target both rival organisations and Mexican government personnel. An undisclosed number of Mexican soldiers have been killed by cartel UAV attacks, with at least 8 soldiers killed by IEDs of unspecified employment between 2018 and 2024. 42 people were wounded by cartel bombing attacks in 2023 by August, up from 16 wounded in 2022. UAV-delivered munitions in Mexico—whether dropped by UAVs or integrated into UAVs to form crude guided munitions—are usually reported generically as ‘improvised explosive devices’ (IEDs), which can sometimes make them difficult to distinguish from more conventional IEDs when reviewing some sources. 2,186 IEDs have been recovered by Mexican government forces between December 2018 and August 2023, with more than half of these recovered in the Mexican state of Michoacán. 2,889 UAV-delivered munitions of various designs were seized in an operation by Mexican authorities in Concordia, Sinaloa on 24 April 2025.

Figure 1 An alleged cartel member posing with a COTS small UAV in Mexico (source: social media via ARES CONMAT Database).

These organisations are clearly learning lessons about the usage of UAVs and the development and production of UAV-delivered munitions from the experiences of state and non-state actors across the globe. Mexican drug cartels’ usage of UAV-delivered munitions is not as sophisticated as that seen displayed by both sides in the Ukraine–Russian War, for example, which has increasingly been driven by the considerable power of state-backed production, but Mexican drug cartels have nonetheless developed limited craft-production capabilities. For example, munitions recovered in 2023 and 2024 are generally more sophisticated than those seen in earlier seizures. The standardisation of these devices indicates more streamlined production processes and the adoption of craft-production standards.

Figure 2 Left: One of five UAVs in the source video each equipped with identical munitions ready for use. Right: Larger DJI UAV next to multiple IADMs and a UAV controller (sources: @All_Source_News, April 2024; @All_Source_News, December 2024)

Modification of COTS small UAVs has become a fixture of modern conflict in recent years, even as states work to develop purpose-built platforms for the same roles. In line with this trend, Mexican drug cartels are using modified commercial UAVs such as the DJI Mavic and Matrice models to deliver small munitions. These models are widely available and can be easily adapted to deliver munitions (see Figure 2). Small UAVs are also used extensively in the ISTAR role, especially for the reconnaissance of rival organisations and government personnel. This includes surveillance across the Mexico–United States border, along which approximately 1,000 UAV incursions from Mexico are occurring each month. COTS small UAVs have been used to monitor government personnel on the border, and in some instances, to deliver drugs across the border. A cartel UAV observing a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) vehicle in the United States can be seen in Video 1. A CBP officer shines a laser at the UAV, as a cheap and relatively ineffective method of countering the ISR capabilities of the platform. A wider range of counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) options are being made available to CBP and Border Patrol at present. Mexican drug cartels are also employing C-UAS devices to counter UAVs operated by both rival organisations and the Mexican government (Figure 3). The procurement of these devices is more difficult and costly than acquiring COTS small UAVs, and clearly demonstrates an understanding of the importance of ‘drone warfare’ in the modern era.

Video 1 A cartel UAV observing a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) vehicle. A CBP officer shines a green laser at the UAV (source: @Anzio20mmFIM92 via @All_Source_News; April 2024).
Figure 3 Alleged cartel members with C-UAS systems (sources: Left, @All_Source_News, 2024; Right, @All_Source_News 2024).

The variety of small, UAV-delivered munitions used can broadly be divided into two groups: ‘air-delivered’ or ‘one-way attack’. In almost all cases when used by Mexican drug cartels, COTS small UAVs have been adapted to drop improvised air-delivered munitions (IADMs). These drones can also drop modified conventional munitions (see Figure 4, right). These types of munitions can be classified as small air-delivered bombs. While there is little evidence of use by Mexican drug cartels, modified conventional munitions or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can be integrated into the UAV platform in such a way as to create what is essentially a crude guided missile (see Figure 4, left). The integration of a munition or IED into a UAV in such as way that the UAV is consumed with the munition results in a design often referred to as ‘one-way attack’ (OWA) UAVs. These are also sometimes referred to as ‘first-person view’ (FPV) UAVs, however this is often a misnomer based on the predominant use of FPV UAVs due to their greater speed and control compared to other UAVs.

Figure 4 Left: A PG7-VL recoilless projectile modified for use with a UAV. Right: A hand grenade modified for delivery by UAV, with the addition of fins, and an impact fuze rather than the striker-release fuze typically seen with hand grenades (sources: Ukraine 46th Airborne Brigade, n.d. / Hamas, 2023).

Conventional munitions will generally need to be modified to function as intended when delivered by a UAV. The nature and extent of these modifications will vary based upon how the munition is delivered. If integrated or semi-permanently fixed to a UAV, for example, a munition’s safety, arming, and/or fuzing mechanisms may need to be modified to ensure it will detonate upon impact at a (relatively) low velocity. If a conventional munition is modified to serve as a small air-delivered bomb, it may benefit from the addition of craft-produced components, such as fins or stabilisers. Munitions normally fitted with time-delay fuzes, such as hand grenades, are sometimes modified to accept impact fuzes. If not correctly modified, UAV-delivered munitions may function prematurely, partially, or not at all. 

The fight against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and more recently the Ukraine–Russian War, has seen the state-backed production of munitions specifically designed for UAV delivery. Nonetheless, modified conventional munitions and IADMs are still the most prevalent types globally. Mexican drug cartels have continued to develop more sophisticated munitions over the past few years, continuing to advance their designs from simple IEDs (see Figure 5) towards the craft production of munitions specifically designed for UAV delivery. 

Figure 5 A COTS small UAV captured from the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG; Jalisco New Generation Cartel), fitted with a simple improvised explosive device (IED) affixed using tape (source: Juan Manuel Gonzalez/ La Silla Rota, April 2020).

Mexican officials first arrested men with a UAV fixed with an IED in 2017. However, in April 2020, two UAVs were captured by a community defence organisation, with attached improvised explosive devices. These devices were crude, and each consisted of a plastic container filled with explosive, reportedly C4, and ball bearings that was taped to a UAV and electrically initiated. IEDs, or munitions, seized since are often clearly intended for use by UAV, featuring fins to help stabilize and orient the munition, and impact fuzing. Munitions recovered in 2023 and 2024 regularly feature fragmentation to enhance the effectiveness of the munitions, with added fragmentation liners, or the device casing being scored. These munitions overwhelmingly appear to feature crude mechanical impact fuzing, where they detonate on impact with the ground or another surface. Numerous videos from cartels show UAVs capable of carrying and dropping several different munitions in a single sortie—a significant upgrade over the devices first pictured in 2020 (see Video 2).

Video 2 A cartel drone dropping multiple munitions on a targets from a rival cartel, reportedly in Santa María del Oro, Jalisco (source: @All_Source_News, 2024).
Figure 6 UAV-delivered munitions seized by the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDNA) (sources: Adiscusión Diario & Pernicious Propaganda, March 2025).

According to Mexico’s Defense Secretary, Luis Cresencio Sandoval, most explosive devices recovered in Mexico make use of black powder as the explosive charge, or use explosives stolen from the commercial mining industry. There are few publicly available images that show the explosive filler, or internal components, for these munitions. Figure 6 shows a UAV-delivered munition that appears to be filled with a commercial ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) mix. The filler material is consistent in shape, grain size, and colour with commercial ANFO (e.g. small pellets or ‘prills’ of a pinkish colour). ANFO is often used incommercial mining operations, and the presence of ANFO in these munitions would be consistent with Secretary Sandoval’s statement. These specific munitions appear to be filled with approximately 0.6 lbs (~270 g) of ANFO, which in equivalent in explosive power to about 0.5lbs (~230 g) of TNT. This is broadly comparable to the explosive power of an M67 hand grenade, used by Mexican and American armed forces, (0.53 lbs TNT equivalent). Mexican drug cartels’ chemistry (drug manufacturing) capabilities and access to chemical precursors means that there is a significant risk of these organisations producing their own, more powerful explosives rather than relying on the theft or purchase of commercial mining explosives for UAV-delivered munitions. 

Figure 7 A large improvised air-delivered munition (IADM) seized by Mexican authorities. This is believed to be the largest UAV-delivered munition used by a Mexican cartel to date, with an estimated diameter of 190 mm and an estimated length of 500 mm (sources: ElGuzman & Pernicious Propaganda, March 2025).

Currently, there are no open-source indications that cartels have developed an anti-armour capability for their UAV-delivered munitions. Such designs are commonplace elsewhere, and typically feature a shaped charge. Mexican drug cartels possess armoured vehicles, which makes the future development of anti-armour or dual-purpose UAV-delivered munitions very likely as conflicts between rival organisations continue to escalate. New variants and further developments of UAV-delivered munitions continue to appear frequently. In March 2025, a munition believed to be the largest UAV-delivered munition thus far seen in use by Mexican cartels was captured by Mexican officials (see Figure 7). This munition is estimated to have roughly three times the explosive capacity of the UAV-delivered munitions seen in Figure 6. 

FPV UAVs, typically used as OWA or ‘sacrificial’ UAVs, are prevalent in the Ukraine–Russia war, but only one possible FPV OWA UAV has been recorded in Mexico. Figure 8 shows a DJI Avata 2 model UAV, that was possibly intended for use as an OWA munition. The red box denotes possible bulk explosive material, while the green circle denotes a possible indicator that the initiation device failed to properly detonate the bulk explosives. If this figure does indeed show explosive material, it would represent the first public imagery of an OWA UAV being used in Mexico.

Figure 8 A downed DJI Avata 2 UAV that was possibly intended for use as an OWA munition. Note: red box and green circle added by the author (source:Mistério/Pernicious Propaganda, April 22, 2025).

Munition Examples

The following figures show a variety of munitions designed to be employed by UAVs that have been seized by Mexican authorities, or posted on social media by cartel members, between March 2021 and April 2025. This is not an exhaustive list of UAV munitions recorded by ARES during this time period, and UAV munitions are regularly used, and seized, in Mexico. Some organisations, or units within organisations, are clearly more sophisticated than others. Figures 14, 15, and 16 all show munitions seized in Sonora, Mexico, that have a mostly standardised, uniform construction. While constructed from widely available pipe material, they have been scored to enhance fragmentation, feature impact fuzing, and have been fitted with stabilising fins. Other examples examples of UAV-delivered munitions recovered in Mexico show considerably less sophistication, with some being extremely crude. Often munitions will have different sized fins, for example. One example below uses part of a plastic bottle for a stabiliser. 

Figure 9 Relatively crude but standardised UAV-delivered IADMs seized by Mexican authorities (source: SSP MICHOACÁN, March 2021).
Figure 10 An IADM visible in a cartel video (source: @just_some_d00d; Charbell Lucio/Revolucion News, May 2021.)
Figure 11 IADMs designed to be dropped from COTS small UAVs, along with a RotorLogic DJI Mavic 2 Pro/Zoom Remote Controller, seized by Mexican authorities in La Ruana, Michoacán (source: El Huaso and Enojon, Borderland Beat, September 2023).
Figure 12 Standardised UAV-delivered IADMs seized by Mexican officials (source: Secretaría de Seguridad Jalisco, October 2023).
Figure 13 UAV-delivered IADMs seized by Mexican Authorities (source: @calvariae_locus, February 2024).
Figure 14 Multiple IADMs intended for employment from UAVs (source: @All_Source_News, June 2024).
Figure 15 IADMs seized by Mexican authorities (source: Fiscalía General de la República – Sonora, August 2024).
Figure 16 Four PG-series recoilless projectiles (colloquially called ‘rocket propelled grenades’, or RPGs) and eight IADMs amongst seized munitions (source: @All_Source_News, September 2024).
Figure 17 IDAMs seized by Mexican authorities in Sonora (source: Santiago Delta, November 2024).
Figure 18 A UAV carrying a small munition, seized by Mexican authorities in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas (source: @All_Source_News, September 2024).
Figure 19 Left: An unexploded UAV-delivered IADM with an impact fuze in the nose and fins for stabilisation. Right: A munition with an electrical wire connected, possibly dropped by a UAV (source: @All_Source_News, December 2024).
Figure 20 A cartel member with two UAV-delivered munitions and a DJI controller (source: @All_Source_News, January 2025).
Figure 21 Equipment seized by Mexican authorities, including a DJI UAV and several UAV-delivered munitions (sources: #HRSANTOS and Pernicious Propaganda, January 2025).
Figure 22 A UAV-delivered munition seized by Mexican authorities. Note the improvised stabilising fins made from the top of a plastic bottle (sources: SSP MICHOACÁN and Pernicious Propaganda, February 2025).
Figure 23 UAV-delivered munitions posted by alleged cartel members on social media (sources: El Baleado and Pernicious Propaganda, February 2025).
Figure 24 UAV-delivered IADMs seized by Mexican authorities near Nuevo Tonalá, Sinaloa (sources: Ríodoce and Pernicious Propaganda, March 2025).
Figure 25 A UAV-delivered munition reportedly used in an cartel attack on March 23, 2025 (sources: halipon and Pernicious Propaganda, March 2025).
Figure 26 A fraction of the 2,889 UAV-delivered munitions seized by Mexican authorities in Concordia, Sinaloa, in April 2025 (source: Noroeste, April 2025).
Figure 27. A UAV-delivered IADM with an electrical impact fuze. Most Mexican UAV-delivered munitions feature a mechanical impact fuze, making this a rather unusual example (source: Noroeste, April 2025).

Special Thanks to Twitter/X Users: All Source News (@All_Source_News) and Pernicious Propaganda (@natsecboogie) for their extensive documentation of Mexican drug cartel activities.

Sources

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Remember, all arms and munitions are dangerous. Treat all firearms as if they are loaded, and all munitions as if they are live, until you have personally confirmed otherwise. If you do not have specialist knowledge, never assume that arms or munitions are safe to handle until they have been inspected by a subject matter specialist. You should not approach, handle, move, operate, or modify arms and munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. If you encounter any unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW), always remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

AVOID the area
RECORD all relevant information
MARK the area from a safe distance to warn others
SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities