Trevor Ball
In recent months, Iranian media have published imagery of an unidentified model of one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used in attacks on Iran. The first documented use of this munition in Iran was on 20 March 2026, twenty days into the 2026 Iran War, although they may have been used earlier. ARES has assessed that these UAVs are of United Arab Emirates (UAE) origin, suggesting that the UAE likely directly participated in attacks against Iran at least as early as that date. Two other models of Emirati OWA UAVs have been used extensively in Sudan by the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is assessed with moderate-to-high confidence that the state-owned EDGE Group, and its subsidiaries, is the manufacturer of these three models of OWA UAVs.
The OWA UAV model documented in Iran has been recorded in the ARES Conflict Materiel (CONMAT) Database and entered into the Open-source Munitions Portal (OSMP), having been assigned an ARES temporary munition identifier (TMID) of TMID-0015. It is of similar construction to the other two models of UAE origin, both of which were prominently displayed by the UAE during the ‘Desert Tiger 7’ joint exercise conducted with Malaysia in February 2023 (see Figure 3). These latter two models have been assigned the ARES temporary munition identifiers of TMID-0013 and TMID-0014 (Figure 2).
TMID-0013 and TMID-0014 have been used in Sudan by the Emirati-backed RSF. TMID-0014, although clearly a distinct model, shares some components with TMID-0015. These include the same make and model of engine, and the warhead. TMID-0015 and TMID-0014 both use the Modamer warhead, a design manufactured by Halcon, a subsidiary of EDGE Group, which is a UAE state-owned company. Before appearing at Desert Tiger 7, and later in Sudan, a TMID-0014—or potentially an earlier variant—was also documented in 2021 and 2022. Three UAVs, apparently of the TMID-0014 design, are captured in satellite imagery of an Emirati UAV testing facility in 2021 (see Figure 4); a downed TMID-0014 UAV was also filmed in Yemen in 2022 (Figure 5).
As noted, TMID-0013 and TMID-0014 (see Figure 6) have both been used by the RSF in Sudan, who were very likely supplied with these munitions directly by the UAE. A United Nations fact-finding mission report published 1 September 2026 stated that verified evidence “provides reasonable grounds” that individuals and entities in the UAE, among other countries, have facilitated the RSF’s military operations. Equipment transferred to the RSF “included material consistent with equipment previously exported to the United Arab Emirates”.
The first reported instance of the RSF utilising OWA UAVs was on 9 April 2024, when the RSF launched a TMID-0013 model OWA UAV at the city of Gedaref. Human Right Watch interviewed an individual who physically inspected one of these UAVs found in Sudan, who stated “it bore no markings and that the serial numbers of the drone’s components had been apparently deliberately scratched off”. Nabih Bulos, reporting for the Los Angeles Times, inspected at least two remnants of the TMID-0014 in Sudan and reported that all serial numbers had been removed.
TMID-0013 has been documented using an 81 mm mortar projectile installed in the nose as its warhead, whereas TMID-0014 appears to use an Emirati-made warhead model known as the Modamer (see Figures 7 & 8), and features a frame that fits this just forward of the fuel tank (Figure 9). The webpage of the manufacturer of the Modamer warhead, Halcon, was taken down at some point after September 2023, when it was archived. Halcon described it as a blast-fragmentation warhead with the following technical characteristics:
Length: 377.5 mm
Calibre: 202 mm
Weight: 34.5 kg
Number of fragments: 69,000
The Modamer warheads seen in Sudan have been fitted with the Serbian UT M18 fuze (see Figure 7), as well as another model of point-detonating fuze. The UT M18 fuze has also been observed fitted to 120 mm thermobaric air-delivered bombs recorded in Sudan (Figure 10, left). Crates of these bombs, fitted with the UT M18 fuze, have been captured from the RSF. The crates were marked to indicate they were intended to be delivered to the UAE Armed Forces (Figure 10, right). Human Rights Watch has reported that these munitions were imported to the UAE under a contract with Abu Dhabi Autonomous Systems Investments (ADASI), a subsidiary of EDGE Group.
ADASI has shown the UT M18 fuze in promotional images and models of their RASH series of guided munitions since their introduction in 2021. Images of the RASH-1M and RASH-2M on the EDGE Group website currently feature payloads with a UT M18 fuze installed (see Figure 11).
TMID-0015, which has so far only been documented in Iran, also uses the Modamer warhead (see Figure 12), and features construction similar to TMID-0014, including the same actuators, pushrod housings, and small black and white stickers—likely for quality control (see Figure 13). TMID-0014 and TMID-0015 also use the same make and model of twin-piston gas engine, which is similar in construction to the make and model used by Edge Group’s Shadow 50-P OWA UAV. TMID-0013 and TMID-0014 have not yet been publicly documented in Iran.
Photos of TMID-0015 munitions, including visible Modamer warheads, were first posted by Iranian media on 29 March (see Figure 14), almost a month into the 2026 Iran War. However, remnants of the make and model engine known to be used with TMID-0015 and TMID-0014 were published as early as 20 March (Figure 15). The Modamer warheads documented so far in Iran do not appear to use the UT M18 fuze, instead substituting it for another model of point-detonating fuze. The video published by Iranian media on 20 March 2026 shows the Iranian military assessing the burning wreckage of a downed OWA UAV. The engine components visible in the wreckage match the engine model and construction methods used by TMID-0014 and TMID-0015, including the mufflers and the construction of the crankshaft housing (Figure 16).
The Shadow-50P, an OWA UAV publicly acknowledged as being produced by ADASI (an EDGE Group subsidiary), has been seen fitted with a similar make and model of twin-piston engine as those used in TMID-0015 and TMID-0014. This features, in particular, key similarities in the crankcase housing.
As only TMID-0015, and not TMID-0014 or TMID-0013, have been observed in Iran, it is likely TMID-0015 UAVs were used in strikes at least as early as 20 March 2026. By this point in the war, according to the UAE Ministry of Defense, Iran had launched 338 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,740 UAVs at the UAE. Whilst The Wall Street Journal has reported that the UAE conducted “dozens of airstrikes against Iran beginning in the early days of the war”, the identification of the remnants of probable TMID-0015 UAVs represents the earliest public evidence of Emirati participation in the war thus far.
Additional images of TMID-0015, TMID-0014, and TMID-0013 are available via the Open Source Munitions Portal.
Sources
Bulos, Nabih. 2026. ‘Drones turn Sudan’s ‘forgotten’ war into a relentless civilian killing field’. Los Angeles Times (24 May). <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-05-24/drones-turn-sudans-forgotten-war-into-relentless-civilian-killing-field>.
EDGE Group. 2024. ‘Shadow 50 Testing’. YouTube video (18 January). <https://youtu.be/j-fYAVGu-xs>.
EDGE Group. 2026. ‘ADASI Shadow 50’. Edge Group. <https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/shadow-50>.
EDGE Group. 2026. ‘RASH-1M’. Edge Group. <https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/rash-1-m>.
EDGE Group. 2026. ‘RASH-2M’. Edge Group. <https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/rash-2-m>.
Halcon. 2023. ‘Modamer Warhead’. Edge Group. Available via: <https://web.archive.org/web/20230925125134/https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/modamer-warhead>.
Human Rights Watch. 2024. Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties’ Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/09/fanning-flames>.
Open Source Munitions Portal. 2026. ‘ARES-TMID-0013, ARES-TMID-0014, ARES-TMID-0015’. <https://osmp.ngo/?model=arestmid0015%2Carestmid0013%2Carestmid0014>
Said, Summer & Shelby Holliday. 2026 ‘The U.A.E. Has Been Secretly Carrying Out Attacks on Iran’. The Wall Street Journal (11 May). <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-a-e-has-been-secretly-carrying-out-attacks-on-iran-f1745a0d?>.
Said, Summer & Anat Peled. 2026 ‘The U.A.E.’s Secret Role in the War Involved Dozens of Strikes on Iran’. The Wall Street Journal (29 May). <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-u-a-e-s-secret-role-in-the-war-involved-dozens-of-strikes-on-iran-7fd28c40>.
United Nations Independent International Fact-finding Mission for the Sudan. 2026. Fuelling Sudan’s Conflict: Weapons, Fighters and External Support Networks (1 September). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/09/sudan-external-support-networks-are-fuelling-conflict-and-civilian-harm-un>.
Remember, all arms and munitions are dangerous. Treat all firearms as if they are loaded, and all munitions as if they are live, until you have personally confirmed otherwise. If you do not have specialist knowledge, never assume that arms or munitions are safe to handle until they have been inspected by a subject matter specialist. You should not approach, handle, move, operate, or modify arms and munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. If you encounter any unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW), always remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:
AVOID the area
RECORD all relevant information
MARK the area from a safe distance to warn others
SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities